How mandatory ifrs adoption changes

Firms' opportunistic behavior: empirical

Evidences from the earnings management

Perspective by FUAD, Fuad
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=1&eb=1&esm=10&oid=1045361291&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=336&r=68.40994697553535&l… 1/18
How mandatory IFRS changes by Fuad
Fuad
From Quick Submit (Quick Submit)
Processed on 27-Nov-2018 09:42 WIB
ID: 1045361291
Word Count: 4815
 
Similarity Index
22%
Internet Sources: 17%
Publications: 18%
Student Papers: N/A
Similarity by Source
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
 Turnitin Originality Report
sources:
4% match (publications)
Leonidas C. Doukakis. "The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on real and accrual-based
earnings management activities", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2014
2% match (Internet from 24-Nov-2015)
http://www.alliedacademies.org/articles/aafsjvol1922015.pdf
1% match (Internet from 10-Apr-2018)
http://eprints.ucm.es/46225/1/T39545.pdf
1% match (Internet from 01-Sep-2017)
http://essay.utwente.nl/70755/1/ter%20Horst%20master%20thesis%20final%20version.pdf
1% match (publications)
Doukakis, Leonidas C.. "The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on real and accrual-based
earnings management activities", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2014.
1% match (Internet from 19-Mar-2016)
http://www.ukessays.co.uk/essays/accounting/detecting-earnings-management.php
1% match (publications)
Yu-Hsuan Chung, Lee-Hsien Pan, Shaio Yan Huang, K.C. Chen. "Do firms change earnings
management behavior after receiving financial forecast warnings?", Global Finance Journal,
2015
1% match (publications)
Lee, Seungwon. "The Effect of Ex-ante CEO Turnover Risk on Firms' Discretionary
Expenditures.(Report)(Abstract)", Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting
1% match (publications)
Chu-Hsuan Chang, Hsiou-Wei William Lin. "Does there prevail momentum in earnings
management for seasoned equity offering firms?", International Review of Economics &
Finance, 2018
1% match (Internet from 18-May-2018)
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=1&eb=1&esm=10&oid=1045361291&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=336&r=68.40994697553535&l… 2/18
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/32040/12/Tarek%20Elkalla%27s%20Approved%20PhD%20Thesis%20PDF.pdf
1% match (Internet from 12-May-2016)
http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/48322/files/TESIS-2016-117.pdf
1% match (Internet from 20-Mar-2014)
http://www.mastercca.cnam.fr/PDF/SUPPORT%20DE%20COURS/CFA%20246/CFA246-
RIVAL-Tax-aggressiveness.pdf
< 1% match (publications)
Haga, Jesper, Jimi Siekkinen, and Dennis Sundvik. "A neural network approach to measure
real activities manipulation", Expert Systems with Applications, 2015.
< 1% match (Internet from 20-Jul-2018)
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?amp=&article=3731&context=etd
< 1% match (publications)
Petry, Stefan. "Mandatory Worker Representation on the Board and Its Effect on Shareholder
Wealth.(Report)", Financial Management, Spring 2018 Issue
< 1% match (Internet from 26-Mar-2014)
http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/27595/2/SSRN-id1081939.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 26-Aug-2013)
http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/20021/91-113_lippens.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 22-May-2014)
http://thesis.eur.nl/pub/11565/MA190-deVries_311429.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 05-Apr-2016)
http://eprints.unsri.ac.id/6187/1/ACCOUNTING_pp_307%2D557.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 06-Apr-2018)
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=134241
< 1% match (Internet from 29-Nov-2017)
http://www.ros.hw.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10399/2934/ChatzivgeriE_2013_sml.pdf?
isAllowed=y&sequence=1
< 1% match (Internet from 20-Jul-2018)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16081625.2016.1253484
< 1% match (Internet from 09-Apr-2016)
http://www.sciencepubco.com/index.php/IJAES/article/view/5721
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=1&eb=1&esm=10&oid=1045361291&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=336&r=68.40994697553535&l… 3/18
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
< 1% match (Internet from 24-Aug-2018)
http://pdie.feb.undip.ac.id/index.php/artikel/informasi/236
< 1% match (Internet from 25-Feb-2007)
http://biologicalprocedures.com/bpo/arts/1/73/m73.htm
< 1% match (Internet from 13-Aug-2018)
http://www.cya.unam.mx/index.php/cya/article/download/1233/1309
< 1% match (Internet from 11-Sep-2013)
http://libsysdigi.library.uiuc.edu/OCA/Books2011-
08/internationaljou/internationaljou41univ/internationaljou41univ_djvu.txt
< 1% match (Internet from 20-Sep-2015)
http://www2.aaahq.org/AM/ethics/4485.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 04-Jan-2017)
http://www.na-businesspress.com/JAF/AmiduM_Web16_2_.pdf
< 1% match (publications)
Young, Chaur-Shiuh, Yueh-Ju Lin, Fei-Liang Chien, and Chia-Hui Chen. "CEO Succession,
Investor Expectations, and Real Earnings Management", Asian Journal of Finance &
Accounting, 2015.
< 1% match (publications)
Panagiotis E. Dimitropoulos, Dimitrios Asteriou, Dimitrios Kousenidis, Stergios Leventis. "The
impact of IFRS on accounting quality: Evidence from Greece", Advances in Accounting, 2013
< 1% match (publications)
Norhayati Zamri, Rahayu Abdul Rahman, Noor Saatila Mohd Isa. "The Impact of Leverage on
Real Earnings Management", Procedia Economics and Finance, 2013
< 1% match (publications)
Thomas Kozloski, Michele Meckfessel, Stephen R. Moehrle, Thomas Williams.
"Developments in accounting regulation: A synthesis and annotated bibliography of evidence
and commentary in the 2014 academic literature", Research in Accounting Regulation, 2016
< 1% match (Internet from 01-Sep-2018)
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54578001/FULL_TEXT.PDF
< 1% match (Internet from 29-Dec-2015)
http://www.world-finance-conference.com/papers_wfc2/358.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 20-Jul-2018)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16081625.2016.1231580
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=1&eb=1&esm=10&oid=1045361291&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=336&r=68.40994697553535&l… 4/18
37
38
39
40
< 1% match (Internet from 13-Mar-2017)
http://www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/COC__Volume_13_Issue_2_Winter_2016_Continued_3_-2.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 08-Apr-2015)
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d4c14d974afe04a1b171de0c.html
< 1% match (publications)
Sun A Kang. "An empirical study on the reliability and informativeness of accounting numbers:
after enforcing the internal accounting control system in Korea", International Journal of
Accounting and Finance, 2010
< 1% match (publications)
Abiot Tessema, Rogier Deumes. "SFAS 133 and income smoothing via discretionary
accruals: The role of hedge effectiveness and market volatility", Journal of International
Financial Management & Accounting, 2018
paper text:
24HOW MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION CHANGES FIRMS’ OPPORTUNISTIC
BEHAVIOR: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES FROM THE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Fuad, Diponegoro University Wahyu Tri Wijanarto, Diponegoro University
20ABSTRACT The purpose of this research is to examine the effects of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)- based accounting standards
on
7both accrual-based and real earnings management. We
utilized modified Jones model
13as a proxy for accrual based earnings management, while abnormalities
found on
13cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses and production
expenses are used as
9proxies for real earnings management. Using
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data from Indonesian manufacturing firms from 2009 to 2014, we found that adoption of IFRS limits
discretionary behaviour in earnings management while the
9earnings management from real activities is more
prevalent
17in the post IFRS period. Keywords: IFRS, Real Earnings Management, Accrual
Earnings Management,
Panel Data Analysis. INTRODUCTION Managerial opportunistic behaviour in the scope of financial reporting
has become one of the main concerns for years. Agency theory has long argued that when the ownership
and management are separated, the accounting and operational functions are affected by agency conflicts
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and increase the information asymmetry between principal and managers. As
a consequence,
11managers may have the incentive to make decisions to fulfil their interest
while to some extent, neglecting the interests of principal. Earnings management practice is one of those
activities as a result of agency conflicts. Numerous researches have tried to uncover the reasons (and
consequences) of the earnings management practice. However, we emphasized the roles of accounting
standards that may inhibit (or foster) managerial opportunistic behaviour through earnings management.
International Financial Reporting Standards was gradually implemented in Indonesia since 2012 in a hope to
increase accounting and financial reporting quality. Researches however are stand divided about this. For
example, more flexible accounting standard as in IFRS provides a greater scope for the discretion policy
11and involve a higher degree of subjectivity implied in the application of
criteria (Jeanjean and
Stolowy, 2008). These “flexible” rules encourage managers to have a broader space in applying their
policies that can be used for their own interests if there is no effective control mechanism. Callao and Jarne
(2010) maintained that firms regulated by the “loose” accounting standards tend to engage more earnings
management
4(Callao and Jarne, 2010). Additional evidences showed that the principle-based
accounting
standards in IFRS provides more flexibility and hence looser as compared to the competing generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) which is known to be “rules-based”. Capkun et al. (2012) also
documented that earnings management increase can be observed among the companies in the countries
that allow early IFRS adoption. However, Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) found that IFRS have restricted
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6effect on earnings management in Brazil after the full implementation of IFRS.
Sellami and Fakhfakh (2014) on the other hand found that there is a
26decrease in the value of the absolute discretionary accruals during the six
years after the mandatory adoption of
IFRS in France. Doukakis et al. (2014) shows
33that mandatory IFRS does not significantly affect the level of accrual and real
earnings management.
Our research on the other hand, does not attempt to test whether there is a blessing (or curse) after IFRS
implementation. Rather, we try to uncover the
5earnings management practices on the accrual
properties of accounting and manager’s tendencies to manage their reported earnings through real
operational activities; which are also one of our contributions in the financial accounting literature. Healy
(1999) maintained that accrual-based earnings management are usually conducted by using extensive
judgment in preparing the financial reporting and modifying financial transactions
37to mislead the users of financial statements about the firms’ real
performance. Roychowdury (2006) on the
other hand, define real earnings management as management desire to mislead the users of financial
reporting by manipulating the operational activities that are supposed to in normal fashion. Our contributions
also stem from the fact
1that the impact of IFRS to real earnings management is
categorized into their three main activities, namely:
10abnormal production costs, abnormal net cash flow from operations and
abnormal discretionary
expenses. We also test whether IFRS may inhibit or foster those activities The
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8remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
relevant literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample
selection, variable measurement and research design. Section 4 presents the
result. Section
5 provides summary conclusions, limitation of this study and future research potentials. LITERATURE
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Earlier researches have documented that IFRS may change
how management behaves in managing their earnings. For example, Christensen et al. (2008) found that
income smoothing is significantly lower among the firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to its effective date.
They further found that mandatory adopters perceive that the cost of early adoption outweighs its benefits.
However,
21Capkun et al. (2012) noted that earnings management increased
can be observed among the firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS. Further studies have also documented the
impacts of IFRS adoption (or convergence) on accounting quality.
4Chen et al. (2010) for instance, found a convincing evidence of earnings
management
and absolute discretionary accruals and variations of unexplained accruals. Furthermore, they documented
that IFRS encourages companies to engage in income smoothing practices.
6On the other hand, Aussenegg et al. (2008) using the sample
from 17 European countries found that earnings management decrease can be observed among the firms
following IFRS adoption as opposed to countries-specific (i.e., domestic) standards. Firms also possess
another alternative to manage their earnings through manipulating their real operational activities.
1Graham et al. (2005) conducted a survey indicating that managers prefer real
earnings management instead of accrual-based earnings management.
Empirical measures of
Roychowdhury (2006) also showed that the avoidance of losses reporting by the managers can be used
through manipulation of their real activities management. A study conducted by
1Zang (2012) found the trade-off and substitution between accrual-based and
real earnings management. She
also documented
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5a negative correlation between accrual and real earnings management. IFRS
Adoption and Accrual Earnings Management
As previously mentioned, IFRS provides inherent flexibility in applying the assets estimation through, for
example, fair values method. This flexibility is provided through various alternatives in depreciation methods,
inventory and revenue recognition, among others. Therefore, IFRS may provide broader room for the
managers to achieve and set particular earnings that is not provided by prior, GAAP-based standards. Prior
researches, to some extent also concur with the above lemma. For example, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008)
analysing the deviation of the income distribution as a proxy
6of earnings management examined the impact of IFRS on three countries
(i.e., Australia, United Kingdom and France). They found
1that earnings management in those countries are not
declining
4and even increasing in France. Callao and Jarne (2010) also showed that the
earnings management increased since the adoption of IFRS in
11 countries in Europe. Using data in New Zealand from 2002-2009, Kabir et al. (2010) found that
discretionary accruals are higher
21after the adoption of IFRS and shows a lower quality of earnings
at the time of IFRS implementation as compared to the pre IFRS. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis as
follows: H1: Accrual earnings management practices are higher after IFRS convergence IFRS Adoption and
Real Earnings Management Indeed, better accounting standards guarantee a better accounting quality,
where they may increase the value relevance of financial reporting and earnings variability, among others.
This will also yield that the firms’ financial reporting can be easily scrutinized by the auditors and regulators.
As a consequence,
28firms may opt to engage in real earnings management as it is more difficult to
detect when they try to manage their earnings rather than using accruals. Earlier researches have also
noted that IFRS may increase the real management activities. One of the notable researches include
Lippens (2008) that tested both real and accrual-based earnings management for the firms in EU countries
following mandatory IFRS adoption. He
18expected that the rate of accrual earnings management will increase in the
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period after
6mandatory adoption of IFRS and level of real earnings management will
decline during the
period. However, using the periods of 2000-2006 he showed that
18level of accrual and real earnings management increase significantly in the
period
1after mandatory adoption of IFRS. In
a survey
32study, Graham et al. (2005) found that managers prefer managing earnings
through real activities than
through accrual policy. This is in line with Zang (2012) stating that the manager doing the manipulation of
earnings through real activities first and then adjust the level of target profit by the use of discretionary
accrual policies. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: H2: earnings management through real
operational manipulation increases after firms adopt IFRS RESEARCH METHOD Sample
19Selection The population in this study includes all manufacturing listed firm in
Indonesian Stock Exchange
from 2009-2014.The study
1excludes observations with negative book value of equity and missing
values. Data was taken from audited financial statement and annual report of the firm that publish at
Indonesian Stock Exchange website (http://www.idx.com). As a result, we found a balanced sample set
consist of 438 observation. Accrual Earnings Management Measure In this research, accrual earnings
management is calculated using Modified Jones Models developed by
2Dechow et al. (1995). They showed that Modified Jones Model is
way better in earnings management detection rather than the original Jones model. They further also further
added the change in account receivable in order to control for the possibility to use revenue as a source of
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earnings management. Modified Jones Models based on Dechow et al. (1995) are as follows: TAit/Assetsit
39-1=α0(1/ Assetsit -1)+α1( ΔSalesit/Assetsit -1)+α2( GPPEit/Assetsit -1)+εit (1)
1where TAit=total accruals, which is calculated as firm net income minus cash
flows from operations;
Assetsit
38-1=total assets for firm; ∆Salesit =change in sales; GPPEit =gross property,
plant and
equipment. Estimated parameters from
16(1) are then used to estimate the firm-specific nondiscretionary accruals
(NDAit): NDAit=α0(1/Assetsit-1)+α1(ΔSalesit/Assetsit-1–ΔARit/Assetsit-1)+α2(GPPEit/Assetsit-1) (2) Where
NDAit=non-discretionary accruals;
1∆ARit=change in accounts receivable from year t- 1 to year t, while all other
variables are as previously defined. We use discretionary accruals (DA) which
is the difference between total accruals and the fitted nondiscretionary accruals
to measure accrual earnings management, which is defined as DAit=(TAit/Assetsit-1)–NDAit (3)
1Where DAit=discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. Real Earnings
Management
Measure Roychowdury (2006) defined
1real earnings management as the difference
in operating practices with normal operating practice, motivated by the desire of management to mislead
stakeholders so that they believe that the purpose of a particular
14financial reporting have been achieved in the normal operation practice of the
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company. Some areas that can be exploited in real activities manipulation include overproduction, sales
management and reduction of discretionary expense. We use the following regression models for earnings
management in three possible areas, including production (PROD), sales management (CFO) and
discretionary expense reduction (DIEXP) is as follows:
3PRODit/Ait-1= α0 +β1(1/Ait-1)+β2(Sit/Ait-1)+β3(ΔSit/Ait-1)+β4(ΔSit-1/Ait-
1)+εit
(4)
3CFOit/Ait-1= α0 +β1(1/Ait-1)+β2(Sit/Ait-1)+β3(ΔSit/Ait-1)+εit
(5) DISXit
3/Ait-1= α0 +β1(1/Ait-1)+β2(Sit- 1 /Ait-1)+
εit (6) where PRODit equals
36to production costs, which is the cost of goods sold plus inventories yearly
change;
CFOit is firms’ cash flows from operations; DISXit is discretionary expenses that is measured as
14selling, general and administrative expenses and Ait-1 is firms’ total assets;
and ∆Sit=yearly sales
changes. As with prior researches, this study used the residuals found in equations (4), (5) and (6) to
measure
1abnormal production cost (ABN_PROD), abnormal net cash flow from
operations (ABC _CFO) and abnormal value of discretionary expenses (ABN_
DISEXP), respectively. In line with
7Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), among others, the value of
1ABN_CFO and ABN DISX are multiplied by -1 so that the higher value indicates
the
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=1&eb=1&esm=10&oid=1045361291&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=336&r=68.40994697553535… 12/18
higher
1manipulation through price discounts and cutting discretionary expenses.
To test the second hypothesis, we use the summated, composite score. We also run sensitivity tests, in
which real earnings management proxies are separately regressed on IFRS. Panel Data Regression Panel
data regression was used to test our hypotheses, since our study employs cross sectional firms and multiple
years. Using panel regression analysis for these multidimensional types of data gives more efficient estimate
(Baltagi 2005). Furthermore, with the panel data analysis, the unobserved heterogeneity both in time as well
companies can also be controlled. The panel regression models are tested based on the following models:
ABS_DA=α0+α1IFRSit+α2BIG4it+α3GROWTHit+α4SIZEit+α5 LEVit+α6ROEit+α7REALit+εit (7)
REAL=α0+α1IFRSit+α2 BIG4it+α3GROWTHit+α4SIZEit+α5 LEVit+α6ROEit+α7ABS_DAit+εit (8) where
ABS_DA=absolute value of accrual earnings management; REAL=total value of real earnings management;
IFRS=dummy variable, 1 for 2012-2014 periods and 0 otherwise. We used several control variables
including growth (GROWTH), audit size (BIG4) financial leverage (LEV), firm size (SIZE) and profitability
(ROE). BIG4 is a dummy variable indicating that whether the firms hired a Big 4 auditor, GROWTH is
measured as the sales change
1to control for the growth on earnings management.
In order
27to control for the effect of firm size on earnings management,
40we measure SIZE as the natural logarithm of firm’s market value.
35LEV is the firm’s financial leverage which is the proportion of total liabilities to
5as the ratio of total liabilities to prior year’s total assets. Return on equity
(ROE) is measured as the net income over last year’s shareholders equity.
Researches (for
example Doukakis 2014 and Zang 2012) have also concluded that real earnings management is conducted
when firms do not have enough flexibility in earnings management through accrual discretions. Therefore,
we also use accrual-based earnings management (ABS_DA) as one of the control variables for the real
earnings management regression. RESULTS
12Descriptive Statistics The descriptive statistics of model are shown on the
Table 1. The
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variable ABS_DA indicates an average of 0.108 which means that the average value of accruals that
generated by management discretion compared to the previous year assets on manufacturing company in
Indonesia. Our study also indicates that 40.6% of our sample was being audited by BIG4. The variable sales
growth (GROWTH) have an average value of 0.097 which shows that the average sales increase against
the previous year on manufacturing company in Indonesia is 9.6%. While 45.1% of assets are financed by
debt, the average of return of equity was 12.4%. Table 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS N Mean Maximum
Minimum Std. Dev. REAL 438 1.113 2.783 -0.152 0.499 ABS_DA 438 0.108 0.416 0.001 0.074 SIZE 438
21.131 25.17 18.060 1.482 GROWTH 438 0.097 0.800 -0.499 0.183 LEV 438 0.451 0.914 0.0413 0.193
ROE 438 0.124 0.591 -0.271 0.117 IFRS 438 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.500 BIG4 438 0.406 1.000 0.000 0.491
Notes: ABS_DA: Accrual
23Earnings Management; REAL: Total Real Earnings Management; IFRS: IFRS
Adoption, Dummy 1
after IFRS Adoption from Year 2012-2014, 0 Prior to IFRS Adoption from Year 2009- 2011; BIG4: Type of
Auditor, Dummy 1 Audited by BIG4, 0 Audited by Non BIG4; GROWTH: Sales Growth; SIZE: Firm Size;
LEV: Leverage; ROE: Return on Equity The correlation statistics which are displayed in Table 2 showed that
discretionary accrual has a positive relationship with
16real earnings management. On the other hand, the real earnings
management is
negatively correlated with the audit size (BIG4) and profitability (ROE) and positively correlated with
leverage (LEV).
12Table 2 CORRELATION RESULTS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 ABS_DA 1 2 REAL 0.143*** 1 3 IFRS 0.037 0.027 1 4 BIG4 -0.021 -0.200*** 0.028 1 5 SIZE 0.006 -0.082
0.134*** 0.344*** 1 6 GROWTH 0.076 -0.054 0.073 0.008 0.082 1 7 LEV 0.066 0.479*** -0.015 -0.180***
0.247*** 0.038 1 8 ROE 0.027 -0.109** -0.140*** 0.249*** 0.060 0.235*** -0.182*** 1 Source: EVIEWS
output, 2016 **
25significant at the 0.05 level *** significant at the 0.01 level Panel Regression
Table 3 presents the regression analysis results of
regression model (7) and regression model (8). Our statistics indicate that the models satisfy all the classical
assumptions. For example, as appeared in Table 3 the VIF scores are all less than 10, indicating no serious
multicollinearity issue. We also corrected the standard errors for their possible biases due to
heteroscedasticity using the White’s method. As been highlighted earlier, we also conducted the Hausman
test to control for time and cross sectional heterogeneity. The tests indicate that fixed effect model is used
for the discretionary accrual and random effect model is used for the real earnings management. On the first
model where the dependent variable is the accrual earnings management the adjusted R-squared value is
0.489. This indicates that the discretionary accrual is explained by the variation of IFRS and all the control
variables (BIG4, SIZE, GROWTH, LEV, ROE and REAL) by 48.9%. F-statistics (6.292) for this is also
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significant at 1% indicating that all the variables significantly affect discretionary accrual. The first hypothesis
(H1) is regarding the adoption of IFRS that may have a positive association with the change in accrual
earnings management practices. Our regression results showed that IFRS adoption has a lower
discretionary accrual by 2.1% as compared to the firms that have yet to implement IFRS (t-value=-2.713).
Surprisingly, our finding cannot confirm our hypothesis that earnings management is increased after IFRS
convergence. Rather we found that inverse association in which earnings management is reduced following
IFRS convergence. We also test whether real earnings management is increased after the infusion of IFRS.
The Adjusted R-squared of this particular model is 0.259. In this regards, we found that
17real earnings management is higher in the post IFRS
implementation by 5.2% as compared to the prior IFRS implementation (t-value=2.522; p=0.0120). Table 3
REGRESSION RESULTS FROM THE POOLED SAMPLE Estimate (t-value) Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
ABS_DA REAL ABS_DA REAL Constant -1.572*** (-4.646) 2.400*** (4.009) IFRS -0.021*** (-2.714) 0.052**
(2.522) 1.068 1.062 BIG4 -0.020 (-0.858) -0.070 (-0.997) 1.298 1.296 SIZE 0.070*** (4.422) -0.076***
(-2.844) 1.370 1.311 GROWTH 0.005 (0.297) -0.219*** (-3.549) 1.093 1.090 LEV 0.035 (0.815) 0.476***
(4.031) 1.596 1.205 ROE 0.145*** (2.673) -0.213 (-1.323) 1.202 1.201 REAL 0.150*** (7.650) 1.396
ABS_DA 1.484*** (8.833) 1.012 Adjusted R² 0.489 0.259 F-statistic 6.292*** 22.827*** Hausman Prob 0.00
1.00 Source: EVIEWS output, 2016 Notes: ABS_DA: Accrual Earnings Management; REAL: Total Real
Earnings Management; IFRS: IFRS Adoption, a dummy variable in which 1 is after IFRS adoption from year
2012-2014, 0 prior IFRS adoption from year 2009-2011; BIG4: Auditor Type, a dummy variable in which 1 is
audited by BIG4 and 0 otherwise; GROWTH: Sales Growth; SIZE: Firm Size; LEV: Leverage; ROE: Return
on Equity **
4significant at the 0.05 level *** significant at the 0.01 level
However, as sensitivity tests, when we decompose the real earnings management intro its three known
activities, we found that Earnings management is lowered in the post IFRS implementation only from sales
management activities (i.e., abnormal cash flow from operations, ABN CFO, t=-1.962) and reduction of
discretionary expenses (AB_DISEXP, t=- 3.135). Nevertheless, we cannot find that real earnings
management through over production (ABN_PROD) is different in the post, vis a vis, pre IFRS
implementation (t=0.348) (Table 4). Table 4 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PROXIES REAL
7EARNINGS MANAGEMENT ABN_CFO ABN_PROD ABN_ DISEXP Constant 0.
023 (0.
251) -1.412***(-3.507) -5.806***(-6.549) IFRS -0.011*(-1.962) 0.003(0.348) -0.068***(-3.135) BIG4 0.036***
(2.754) 0.006(0.165) 0.090(1.099) SIZE 0.003(0.646) 0.060***(3.157) 0.222***(5.263) GROWTH -0.070***
(-4.449) 0.041**(1.986) 0.318***(6.885) LEV -0.150***(-5.518) 0.250***(4.987) 0.137(1.245) ROE 0.403***
(11.237) -0.374***(-6.648) -0.443***(-3.581) REAL ABS_DA -0.756***(-17.618) 0.269***(4.472) -0.519***
(-3.922) Adjusted R² 0.540 0.893 0.857 F-statistic 74.383*** 47.084*** 34.280*** Source: EVIEWS output,
2016 Notes: ABN_CFO: Abnormal Value
30of Cash Flow from Operation; ABN _PROD: Abnormal Value of Production;
ABN _DISEXP: Abnormal Value of
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Discretional Expenses; ABS_DA: Accrual
23Earnings Management; REAL: Total Riil Earnings Management; IFRS: IFRS
Adoption, dummy 1
after IFRS adoption from year 2012-2014, 0 before IFRS adoption from year 2009-2011; BIG4: Type of
Auditor, dummy 1 audited by BIG4, 0 audited by non BIG4; GROWTH: Sales Growth; SIZE: Firm Size; LEV:
Leverage; ROE: Return on Equity *
15significant at the 0. 10 level ** significant at the 0.05 level *** significant at
the 0. 01 level DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION This study tests the impacts of
1mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings management
from Indonesian manufacturing firms. Although prior researches have put serious attention on how IFRS
may affect the earnings management behaviour, but they
22tend to focus more on accrual-based earnings management.
This study however tries to focus both on accounting (i.e., discretionary accrual) and operational aspects of
earnings management, namely real earnings management. Based on a sample of 438 observations from
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) for fiscal years of 2009 to 2014, we found several interesting findings.
First, adoption of IFRS has a negative association with accrual earnings management. It means therefore,
there is a decrease in the level of discretionary accruals on manufacturing companies in Indonesia after a
period of implementation of IFRS. In line with Doukakis (2014), the implementation of IFRS may increase
the firm’s transparency and improve the overall quality of financial reporting. In this case, analysts, investors,
capital market authority are at better position to evaluate and monitor firms’ accounting quality and may
make informed decision based on firms’ accounting options and basic assumptions. As a consequence,
managers may not be at ease to falsify or manipulate its performance in their financial reports. Zeghal
(2012) also mentioned
31that the adoption of IFRS improves the quality of earnings by limiting the
selection of
management decision by eliminating allowed accounting alternative and provide a more consistent approach
to accounting measurements. The
19results of this study are also consistent with a research
conducted by
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29Sellami and Fakhfakh (2014) and Brad et al. (2006) that found the adoption of
IFRS tend to decrease the
earnings management practice based on discretionary accruals. In contrary, we found that real earnings
management tend to be higher in the post IFRS period. A trade-off explanation is provided by
1Cohen et al. (2008) maintain that a decline in one type of earnings
management may be because of the
substitution of another method of earnings management had already occurred. A survey conducted by
Graham (2005) also indicate
9that managers prefer engaging in real earnings management practice rather
than accrual earnings management, as real activities
directly affect the cash flow
22(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Cohen and Zarowin (2010)
also provide further justifications the reasons real earnings management is preferred. As previously
mentioned, aggressive accrual earnings management may lead to higher risk of surveillance by the auditor
and perhaps, regulators. Second, less flexibility is available when the firms engage in accrual earnings
management (i.e., less slack in discretionary accrual for the following periods). This finding also in-line with
Zang (2012) that examined the effect of trade-offs between accrual earnings management
34and real earnings management and generate a negative relationship
between both earnings management.
Like any other research, this study has also some limitations which is necessary to be mentioned. First,
observation on this research is the manufacturing sector. Thus, this research has yet to represent the overall
corporate sector in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Second, we do not properly (and comprehensively) test the
presence
10of the trade-off between real earnings management and accrual based
earnings management and whether the
trade-offs prevails following IFRS adoption. We leave this interesting area for further research. Third, due to
data availability, we do not differentiate mandatory vs. voluntary adopters of IFRS and thus their respective
outcomes to the earnings management are left unexplored. Fourth, it is also interesting to examine the real
earnings management using alternative proxies such as long- term asset sales, stock options, stock
repurchases and structuring investment transactions and corporate fundings. REFERENCES Aussenegg,
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